

Global Market Appetite for Metro Rail

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Abstract

Large infrastructure programs such as railway developments across the globe have the potential to attract a large number of local and international industry actors wanting to participate in the delivery of individual mega-projects and a pipeline of infrastructure initiatives. The level of international participation can vary significantly depending on the geographical location of the project and the procurement approach taken by clients.

Our summary report aims to understand procurement strategies and engagement initiatives by different client organisations in different jurisdictions. Drawing on global experience, insights can be identified that may assist in removing potential blockers to those industry actors that are not participating in the Australian market.

A total of three case studies were developed for this research project: Doha Metro (Qatar), Los Angeles Metro (USA), and Ontario Line (Canada). There are lessons from these jurisdictions that can be applied in a local context to the substantive Sydney Metro program (Australia).

Key words: Metro rail; Procurement; Project Delivery; Funding.

1. Introduction

The NSW government, through Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW, has undertaken a range of proactive market engagement activities, which provide a reasonable level of understanding of industry views for the significant pipeline of transport infrastructure proposed over the next decade. It is clear that there is a high level of interest and appetite from both local and international organisations to contribute to the Sydney Metro program in particular.

However, the two new Sydney Metro lines currently in planning and delivery (as well as future augmentation of these lines and new lines) present new and complex delivery challenges that would benefit from additional targeted market analysis. This paper presents the results of a rapid research study aimed to compile metro rail case studies covering an initial set of comparable jurisdictions to identify which local and global industry actors were procured. In this context, metro rail refers to railway infrastructure that is providing a rapid mass transit service within a major metropolitan area.

2. Methodology

The scope of this analysis was focused on a desktop review to understand industry participants and the nature of procurement for comparable metro rail projects. Importantly, research was supplemented with a series of interviews with project teams directly involved in the delivery of projects with the aim of drawing out the key risks, interfaces, and blockers to participating that may be experienced by industry actors.

41 Leveraging off Mott MacDonald’s global experience, an initial scan identified 14 jurisdictions
 42 with potential to be included:

- 43 • Los Angeles Metro and integrated transport network (USA)
- 44 • San Jose light rapid transit (USA)
- 45 • Ontario Line and wider public transport services (Canada)
- 46 • Crossrail (London, UK)
- 47 • Warsaw Metro (Poland)
- 48 • Baku Metro (Azerbaijan)
- 49 • Rotterdam Metro re-signalling program (Netherlands)
- 50 • Delhi Metro (India)
- 51 • Bangalore Metro (India)
- 52 • Doha Metro, particularly the Terminal station at Hamad International Airport (Qatar)
- 53 • Singapore Mass Rapid Transit network (Singapore)
- 54 • Kaohsiung Metro (Taiwan)
- 55 • Beijing Metro (China)
- 56 • Auckland City Rail Link (New Zealand)

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 58 To obtain relevant insights quickly, a short list of jurisdictions was selected using projects that
 59 had strong existing relationships with client teams and contemporary involvement in project
 60 delivery. A total of three case studies were developed for this research project based on the
 61 following criteria:

- 62 1. Level of relationship with the metro rail project team
- 63 2. Availability of public information regarding the procurement process
- 64 3. Alignment of the metro rail project with a customer outcomes approach
- 65 4. Scale and complexity of the metro rail project

66 The resulting rapid analysis of jurisdictions is presented in Table 1.

67 **Table 1: Rapid analysis of jurisdictions to focus on three case studies.**
 68 **Scoring: 1, Low; 2; Moderate; 3, High.**

Jurisdiction	1: Relationship	2: Availability	3: Alignment	4: Scale & complexity	Total
Los Angeles Metro and integrated transport network (USA)	3	3	3	3	12
San Jose light rapid transit (USA)	3	1	2	1	7
Ontario Line and wider public transport services (Canada)	3	3	3	3	12
Crossrail (London, UK)	2	3	3	3	11
Warsaw Metro (Poland)	3	1	2	1	7
Baku Metro (Azerbaijan)	2	1	1	1	5
Rotterdam Metro re-signalling program (Netherlands)	1	3	1	1	6
Delhi Metro (India)	2	2	2	3	9
Bangalore Metro (India)	1	2	2	3	8

Doha Metro, particularly the Terminal station at Hamad International Airport (Qatar)	3	3	3	3	12
Singapore Mass Rapid Transit network (Singapore)	1	2	2	2	7
Kaohsiung Metro (Taiwan)	2	1	2	2	7
Beijing Metro (China)	2	1	1	2	6
Auckland City Rail Link (New Zealand)	1	3	3	1	8

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70 A questionnaire was prepared in advance of meeting with project teams across the shortlisted
 71 jurisdictions. Each case study involved two separate semi-structured interviews with the local
 72 project teams involved. The knowledge of local project teams unlocked key insights and
 73 provided access to new (public) documentation.

74 The questionnaire, interviews and analysis aligned with the UK Government’s Infrastructure
 75 and Projects Authority’s (IPA’s) Project Initiation Routemap (IPA 2016). The Routemap is
 76 based around six pillars of procurement which form the basis of understanding an effective
 77 procurement approach:

- 78 1. Understanding requirements (outcomes and key specifications): including questions
 79 related to integrated land use and transport outcomes, the customer, and operations.
- 80 2. Engaging the market: including the market sectors required to deliver the project,
 81 processes of engagement, and the range of international companies participating.
- 82 3. Packaging the works: including the number and typologies of contracts, how turn-key
 83 approaches might have been considered, and funding approaches.
- 84 4. Choosing the risk allocation (contracting) model: including critical risks for the project,
 85 alignment of risk allocation and capability of industry actors, and how procurement
 86 approaches might influence risk.
- 87 5. Choosing the route to market/tendering: including what inhibiting factors might be
 88 observed for industry actors to participate in procurement activities.
- 89 6. Communicating the benefits: including engagement with stakeholders and the
 90 community, benefits realization, and how environment or social outcomes might be set
 91 during the procurement process.

92 This initial market appetite analysis was conducted in a sprint format, covering high level
 93 information on each case study. There is an opportunity to further develop the case studies to
 94 more detail, which would require additional interviews and research activities to be undertaken.

95 A summary of insights was prepared, and a comparison of key success factors applied in the
 96 context of current and future Sydney Metro delivery activities.

97

98 **3. Case studies**

99 **3.1. Doha Metro**

100 An overview of Doha Metro is provided in Table 2.

101 **Table 2: Project overview: Doha Metro**

Project element	Specification
Client	Qatar Rail
Location	Doha, Qatar
Cost	Approximately USD\$36 billion committed to date (including both Phase 1 and Phase 2). Equivalent to approximately AUD\$47 billion.
Length	Phase 1 (Doha Metro) construction contracts awarded to the value of USD\$17 billion.
Timing	76km (current – Phase 1), 18km (Phase 2), plus approx. 300km (planned)

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103 Doha Metro in Qatar is a driverless rapid transit system. Phase 1, which covers a length of 76
 104 kilometres with 37 stations across 3 lines, commenced construction in 2013 and began operation
 105 in May 2019. The cost of the overall metro rail project is USD\$36 billion, which includes part
 106 of Phase 2 that will ultimately expand the network to 300 kilometres and almost 100 stations.
 107 Qatar Rail, a state-owned company, is the sole owner of the project.

108 **3.1.1. Market context**

109 Doha Metro was one in a series of metro developments across the Middle East beginning in the
 110 mid 2000’s, following an increase in oil prices and investment thereafter. This series of
 111 developments commenced with Dubai Metro and continued in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
 112 and Bahrain. This is shown in Figure 1.

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115 **Figure 1: Timeline of metro rail investment in the Middle East.**

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117 For all the projects delivered between 2009 and 2017, a single contractor approach was used.
 118 This single Turnkey model, or Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract,
 119 required several consortiums to be formed and new entities to be created to bid on these
 120 projects. Regional politics added further complexities as any international bidders would
 121 require a local partner to help undertake stakeholder management, obtain permits and maintain
 122 client relationships. Notwithstanding this, given that many of these projects were announced
 123 around a similar time, it was expected that interest from participants would be boosted by long-
 124 term opportunities in the region.

125 More recently, a Public Private Partnership (PPP) approach is being tested in Bahrain and
 126 Kuwait. The necessity for this approach stems from a reduction in sovereign wealth (lower oil
 127 prices) and therefore an interest in alternative funding and financing options.


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129 **3.1.2. Approach to procurement**

130 Doha Metro is the only project to date that has taken a different approach to procurement. Qatar
 131 Rail proceeded with a disaggregated packaging approach, which was primarily adopted due to
 132 the ability for several aspects of the project to progress simultaneously by dividing the works
 133 into numerous components. This allowed Qatar Rail to commit to its hard delivery timeline,
 134 achieving completion in advance of the 2020 FIFA Club World Cup (which was subsequently
 135 deferred to 2021 due to Covid-19).

136 The civil (design & construct) works were split into seven major packages – first by line and
 137 then by underground and at-grade/elevated. There was a separate package for major stations
 138 and other minor packages and consulting contracts (Figure 2).

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141 **Figure 2: Procurement approach for the Doha Metro with the origin of industry actors for each package**
 142 **identified.**

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144 Each line was generally comprised of two Design & Construct (D&C) packages with a Project
 145 Management Consultancy (PMC) contractor supervising and managing works on that line. The
 146 systems component had one consortium for the overall network.

147 In each major package of work, joint ventures and consortiums are formed by a partnership of
 148 local and international contractors. While the bulk share is taken by the internationals who bring
 149 international expertise to the project, significant involvement from Qatari firms is encouraged
 150 and taken by the consortiums to provide support needed in terms of authority approvals,
 151 stakeholder management and navigating local legislation.

152 **3.1.3. Wider industry actors**

153 In the case of Doha Metro, given the breakdown of work into numerous packages, there was a
 154 high level of market participation from contractors based in various countries. Typically,
 155 contractors involved in metro projects across the Middle East region are from Germany, Spain,
 156 France, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Japan, South Korea, India and Saudi Arabia.

157 In addition to the successful bidders for the packages identified in Figure 2 above, there are
 158 other major players who operate in the region, such as Siemens (Germany) for rolling stock and
 159 signalling. There was minimal involvement from the Americas, and no involvement from
 160 China. Large civil contractors from the Americas are not very active in the region, while
 161 Chinese contractors not considered by Qatar Rail on projects such as the Mecca Metro.

162 Qatar Rail generated significant global market interest to attract the required number of
 163 international contractors to meet their delivery timeframe. The Middle East region does not

164 appear to face significant issues in getting interest from global contractors and suppliers to bid
 165 for projects due to:

- 166 • many companies already operating in the region on large infrastructure projects;
- 167 • the size of contracts being sufficiently large for contractors to invest;
- 168 • a programme of future projects – strong pipeline of work and deep market;
- 169 • most of the major contractors and suppliers having regional experience and regional
 170 offices; and
- 171 • major companies having local sponsors and agents who provide local intelligence and
 172 services to navigate local rules and resolve disputes.

173 **3.1.4. Takeaways**

174 A high level of international participation in delivering Doha Metro can be attributed to the
 175 following key factors:

- 176 • The certainty of a large pipeline of metro rail construction and operation opportunities
 177 in a single jurisdiction/region meant international contractors were more willing to
 178 invest and make a long-term commitment of people and capability in the region. In
 179 Australia, the pipeline of large-scale metro rail infrastructure projects is not as certain.
- 180 • Adopting well-known and used international contracting models and contract terms.
 181 Australia faces the problem of using bespoke contracting arrangements which are less
 182 favourable and attractive to contractors, rather than standard form contracts.
- 183 • The requirement for local contractors seemed to further encourage international
 184 companies to establish local offices, partnerships and relationships in the jurisdiction.
- 185 • A focus on large Turnkey projects provided experience and momentum for the winning
 186 teams. Only recently has there been a shift to private financing and disaggregated
 187 contract packaging. The latter for Doha Metro driven by the political desire to open by
 188 2020.
- 189 • The client having very little or no experience of developing large scale metro projects,
 190 hence needing to bring in international expertise.

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192 **3.2. Sepulveda Transit Corridor (LA Metro)**

193 An overview of the Sepulveda Transit Corridor is provided in Table 3.

194 **Table 3: Project overview: LA Metro (Sepulveda Transit Corridor)**

Project element	Specification
Client	Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA Metro)
Location	Los Angeles, Sepulveda Corridor between the San Fernando Valley and the Westside of LA
Cost	Approximately USD\$6 to 11 billion for the delivery of the project (including a future extension to LAX)
Length	15 miles (24km) with the option to extend by another 4-5 miles to include the LAX area.
Timing	San Fernando – Westside scheduled to open by 2033-35

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196 The Sepulveda Transit Corridor covers approximately 60 square miles (about 15,500 hectares)
 197 between the San Fernando Valley (the Valley) and the Westside of Los Angeles, including the
 198 Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) area of Los Angeles County. The purpose of the
 199 Sepulveda Transit Corridor Project (the Project) is to provide a high-quality transit service that

200 effectively serves the large and growing travel demand between the San Fernando Valley and
 201 the Westside, including the LAX area.

202 For transit to be a competitive travel option that attracts new riders, there is a need to increase
 203 the speed, frequency, capacity and reliability of transit service and provide convenient
 204 connections to existing and planned transit lines.

205 LA has historically been a city built with car ownership in mind. The Sepulveda corridor has
 206 been the major transportation corridor between the Valley and the Westside for 90 years. As
 207 LA’s San Fernando Valley and Westside have grown, LA Metro, the California Department of
 208 Transportation (Caltrans), and its predecessor agencies have undertaken multiple efforts to
 209 improve mobility in the Sepulveda corridor. Depending on the time of the day, a car ride
 210 between the Valley and the Westside can currently take between 30 minutes and 2 hours. The
 211 development of a train connection between the two areas is expected to reduce this travel time
 212 to under 30 minutes while having the capacity to transport up to 20,000 passengers per hour.

213 **3.2.1. Market context**

214 LA Metro (the client) is required to investigate a range of concepts to meet the mobility and
 215 access needs of the Sepulveda Transit Corridor. Therefore, they are seeking to co-develop
 216 multiple Transit Solution Concepts as a requirement of the environmental review process. Land
 217 acquisition will be evaluated as part of the environmental review and ultimately influence the
 218 final option selected.

219 This approach provides the private sector with considerable time to develop and test solutions
 220 in parallel with genuine stakeholder and community engagement. This seems likely to increase
 221 buy-in for schemes that deliver Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) outcomes while
 222 also diluting the potential for political announcements that might then need to be defended. The
 223 alignment with environmental approval requirements takes pressure off the critical path and
 224 potentially avoids having to modify planning approvals after contract award.

225 **3.2.2. Approach to procurement**

226 LA Metro is using a pre-development agreement (PDA) approach to procurement for the
 227 Sepulveda Transit Corridor Project. The approach provides an opportunity for early contractor
 228 involvement in project definition and design, in collaboration with the public project sponsor.

229 A firm or consortium of firms awarded a PDA (the “PDA Contractor”) provides technical work
 230 products supporting the ongoing development of a project as it progresses through review and
 231 approval processes.

232 When the project scope and design are sufficiently developed, if conditions are met as specified
 233 in the PDA, LA Metro may offer the PDA Contractor the opportunity to submit a firm fixed
 234 price proposal to LA Metro for the delivery of the project. If the proposal is acceptable to LA
 235 Metro, the PDA Contractor may be awarded a contract for delivery and implementation.

236 The timeline for this approach is described in Figure 3.

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Figure 3: Project procurement schedule including significant co-design in advance of awarding a public-private partnership.

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LA Metro has selected two PDA Contractors to each identify and develop a Transit Solution Concept who will develop very different Transit Solution Concepts (Figure 4). Each Contractor will be paid during the PDA engagement and is required to perform a variety of management, design and analysis tasks, and to develop and submit for LA Metro’s approval a progressive series of deliverables to help LA Metro define a project alternative and advance its design, and to develop a plan for delivery and implementation of that project alternative.

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In addition to the two PDA alternatives, LA Metro is developing an additional three alternatives as a requirement of the environmental review. Land acquisition will be evaluated as part of the environmental review and ultimately influence the final option selected.

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PDA team 1 – Sepulveda Transit Corridor Partners (USD \$69.9m proposal for the review phase)	
The proposed solution is a bombardier-type sky train using driverless technology. The heavy rail concept would include the construction of tunnels between the Valley and the Westside. More than 60 per cent of the concept would travel underground, with the remainder of the line traveling primarily in an aerial section. A Valley-to-Westside trip would take just under 20 minutes. Anticipated development cost is USD10.8b	
Bechtel Infrastructure (lead) (USA)	Design Management, Stations, Maintenance & Storage Facility, Geotechnical
Mott MacDonald (USA, UK-owned parent company)	Tunnel, Ventilation, Structural Underground and MEP Stations
TY Lin (USA)	Track/Alignment, Elevated Guideway, Utilities and Drainage
SYSTRA (France)	Traction Power, Communications, Signal & Train Control and Systems
PDA team 2 – LA Skyrail Express (USD63.6m proposal for the review phase)	
The proposed solution includes a surface alignment down the I-405 freeway using a monorail technology. Proposed travel times via monorail are estimated at 24 minutes. Anticipated development cost is USD6.1b	
John Laing (co-lead) (UK)	Project management, finance
BYD (co-lead) (China)	Project management, technology supply and systems integration, co-lead O&M contractor
HDR (USA)	Lead Engineer
Skanska (USA/Sweden)	Lead Construction Contractor
Gensler (USA)	Architect
Innova (USA)	Structural Engineer
ACI (USA)	Co-lead operation and maintenance contractor

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Figure 4: As at April 2021, the project has entered the Pre-Development Agreement and Environmental Review stage with two PDA Contractor teams.

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256 **3.2.3. Wider industry actors**

257 Prior to an initial qualification phase, LA Metro held an industry review to gauge interest.
 258 During this initial qualification phase in 2019, 16 suppliers originally expressed interest. Of this
 259 cohort, two dropped out and four suppliers carried forward to the PDA proposal phase (August
 260 2020).

261 The final two suppliers then progressed into the PDA and Environmental Review phase which
 262 is due to be completed in 2025.

263 Other major industry actors included (prior to final round) included Tutor Perini (USA) and
 264 Lane Construction (USA, Italian-owned parent company).

265 In the US, local contractors are generally outgunned by Spanish contractors who have a better
 266 track record and more experience in the design / build stage of infrastructure projects. In the
 267 LA region, Spanish contractors have previously won work delivering the I-405 freeway and
 268 several segments of the California High Speed Rail. Prominent Spanish contractors include
 269 Dragados, OHL, and Ferrovial.

270 **3.2.4. Takeaways**

271 One of the initial drivers was project completion prior to the 2028 Los Angeles Summer
 272 Olympics. However, more recently the client has acknowledged that the project will not be
 273 completed by then. Notwithstanding, the overall schedule is still likely to be quicker than
 274 progressing a more traditional design and construct approach. Rather than a long period of the
 275 client setting requirements then seeking solutions from the private sector over a relatively short
 276 timeframe, the PDA approach facilitates the co-design of requirements and innovation over a
 277 longer period of time.

278 By taking a PDA approach, LA Metro aims to:

- 279 • produce a project scope that is legally, environmentally, technically, and financially
 280 feasible;
- 281 • optimise project lifecycle performance, risk allocation and management,
 282 constructability, and affordability through early design solutions, innovation, and
 283 private sector PDA Contractor’s rigor and resources;
- 284 • accelerate the delivery process through focused application of resources in parallel
 285 activities to facilitate an earlier opening;
- 286 • develop a financing strategy that may be used to distribute project funding over a long-
 287 term contract and efficiently leverage available LA Metro funding; and
- 288 • select a qualified contractor that understands and supports LA Metro’s project priorities;
 289 including optimising service performance and system integration (short and long term);
 290 minimising lifecycle project costs (design-build and operations and maintenance), and
 291 mitigating community and environmental impacts.

292 The Transit Solution Concepts proposed by the PDA Contractor teams have strong alignment
 293 with the city-building aspirations of the Western Parkland City.

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295 **3.3. Ontario Line**

296 An overview of the Ontario Line is provided in Table 4.

297 **Table 4: Project overview: Ontario Line**

Project element	Specification
Client	Infrastructure Ontario (planning and delivery) and MetroLinx (operations)
Location	Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Cost	\$10.4b - \$12b (Canadian) (the Australian dollar is roughly equivalent)
Length	15.6km with 15 stations proposed.
Timing	Targeted opening date: December 2029. Contract award forecast for 2022. Early/enabling works due for completion April 2022

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299 The Ontario Line is a stand-alone rapid transit line, intending to connect the Ontario Science
300 Centre in the north-east of the city, to Ontario Place in the south-east of the city, located in close
301 proximity to the Billy Bishop Toronto City Centre Airport.

302 The Project aims to provide faster and more consistent access to transport, for the 255,000
303 people that live within a 10-minute walk of an Ontario Line station. The Ontario Line project
304 will deliver a fully automated and electrified rail system, with travel from Exhibition Place to
305 the Ontario Science Centre in 30 minutes (reduced from the current travel time of 70 minutes).
306 This will be done with the introduction of 15 stations across 15.6km of new tunnelled, at grade
307 and elevated rail line.

308 The Project will create a 45 minute or less commute time for more than 57,000 jobs for Toronto
309 residents. By delivering the upgrades, this will aim to reduce road congestion and the current
310 crowding experienced on the existing Line 1 (Yonge-University Line).

311 **3.1.1. Market context**

312 Infrastructure Ontario in particular has established an internationally recognised approach to
313 public-private partnerships (PPP or P3) with a focus on output specifications. This has
314 facilitated the contracting of over 100 Public-Private Partnerships since 2005 establishing a
315 diversity of international industry actors that continue to operate in the Canadian market.

316 During the second half of 2019, market feedback was sought by Infrastructure Ontario and
317 Metrolinx, and received from the majority of the market, that a singular contract for the Ontario
318 Line would be too large for most, with the likelihood of only two companies being able to
319 service one large overarching contract. As a result of this market engagement, the decision was
320 made the Ontario Line is currently being procured via three separate P3 contracts:

- 321 • Rolling stock, systems, operations and maintenance (RSSOM)
- 322 • Southern line civil, stations and tunnel works
- 323 • Northern line civil, stations and tunnel works

324 The Ontario Line project has also involved a series of early/enabling works, which have been
325 procured using more traditional procurement methods instead of P3. These enabling works are
326 forecast for completion by April 2022.

327 The Ontario Line is progressing on schedule with early works forecast for completion by April
328 2022 ahead of the next Provincial election. Requests for proposals were issued in December
329 2020 for the RSSOM contract and Southern Civil, Stations and Tunnel works. The later was
330 awarded in May 2021. The request for proposals for the Northern Civil, Stations and Tunnel
331 works is due to be issued in early 2022.

332 **3.3.2. Approach to procurement**

333 The proposed approach to procurement of the Ontario Line is built upon the existing mature P3
 334 (PPP) model. Infrastructure Ontario has been executing P3 contracts since 2005. Through this
 335 model, suitable risks associated with the design, construction and financing of the project will
 336 be transferred to the private sector.

337 The PPP or P3 model introduces private finance rather than relying on separate client funding,
 338 often referred to as ‘traditional funding’. The PPP therefore incentivises a long-term
 339 relationship with a high degree of risk transfer to the private sector. The client (public sector)
 340 pays instalments to the private sector supplier in the form of a service fee to fund and deliver
 341 infrastructure and related services over an agreed term (typically 15 to 30 years).

342 The private sector supplier typically designs, delivers and finances the facilities and operates
 343 and/or maintains them to output specifications. PPP contracts hold the supplier financially liable
 344 for the infrastructure assets condition and performance throughout the contract term.

345 **3.3.4. Wider industry actors**

346 The Ontario Line attracted a diversity of international market players, with the six consortiums
 347 across the two contracts having a mix of international representation, including but not limited
 348 to:

- 349 • RSSOM Consortiums
 - 350 ○ Connect 6ix: Australia, Italy, France
 - 351 ○ ONConnects: Canada, Keolis France, Germany
 - 352 ○ ONLineLinx: UK, France, Germany, Singapore
- 353 • Southern Civil, Stations and Tunnel consortiums:
 - 354 ○ Community Transit Link: Canada
 - 355 ○ ON-Linx: Italy
 - 356 ○ Ontario Transit Group: Spain

357 **3.3.4. Takeaways**

358 Infrastructure Ontario has established an internationally recognised approach to public-private
 359 partnerships (PPP or P3) with a focus on output specifications. Adopting well-known and used
 360 international contracting models and contract terms would strongly support at least five of the
 361 ten NSW Government Action Plan commitments to the construction sector (NSW Government
 362 2018).

363 The advantages of harmonising contract terms to encourage international participation in local
 364 markets could provide the single greatest benefit in terms of improved resource efficiency.
 365 There are parallels between Sydney Metro West and the Ontario Line.

366 The ability of the private sector to successfully develop and deliver metro rail projects appears
 367 to be enhanced when industry actors or consortia are provided with high levels of ownership.
 368 For example, the PPP approach undertaken by Infrastructure Ontario is intended to set high
 369 levels of responsibility for the provision and operation of infrastructure.

370 **4. Conclusions**

371 The development of the three metro rail case studies presented an opportunity to make a few
 372 key observations pertaining to the procurement approaches taken.

373 Doha Metro:

- 374 • The certainty provided by a strong pipeline of mega-scale metro and rail infrastructure
 375 projects was key to attracting international contractors, who have been willing to make
 376 a long-term investment of people and capability in the region.

- 377 • The requirement for local contractors seemed to further encourage international
 378 companies to establish local offices, partnerships and relationships in the jurisdiction.
 379 • The Doha Metro project represented a shift to disaggregated contract packaging, driven
 380 by its short delivery timeframe.

381 Sepulveda Transit Corridor:

- 382 • The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, established in 1951,
 383 is responsible for transportation planning and coordination, designing, building and
 384 operating rapid transit services.
 385 • Taking a Pre-Development Agreement approach facilitates the co-design of
 386 requirements and innovation over a longer period of time.
 387 • Alignment with environmental approval requirements relieves pressure on the critical
 388 path and potentially avoids having to modify planning approvals after contract award.

389 Ontario Line:

- 390 • There is a significant presence of international players involved in consortia currently
 391 tendering for Ontario Line contracts.
 392 • Rolling stock, systems, O&M PPP are concurrently out to market with the first major
 393 civils package. This supports early buy-in and input from the future operator.
 394 • Being a mature government client pertaining to contract form, Infrastructure Ontario
 395 have contracted over 100 PPPs since 2005. Management of PPP transit solutions is
 396 conducted by a mature government client (Metrolinx).

397 In investigating the three global case studies, it appeared that the level of international
 398 participation in individual projects was influenced by the application of some high-level success
 399 factors:

- 400 • **The level of client maturity.** Clients with a relatively lower level of maturity (e.g. Qatar
 401 Rail) opted for turn-key procurement solutions delivered within a pre-defined
 402 framework, and predominantly transferring risk to the private sector. Clients with a high
 403 level of maturity (e.g. LA Metro) chose to invest into a range of project alternatives
 404 upfront, leaving room for flexible decision-making and co-design of solutions, thereby
 405 lowering risk for all parties involved.
 406 • **The strength of the regional project pipeline.** Railway projects in geographies with a
 407 strong pipeline of work providing opportunities for partnerships with locally based firms
 408 (e.g. Doha Metro) was a key benefit in attracting great participation from international
 409 contractors.
 410 • **The level of contract maturity.** Government clients with a proven, easy to implement
 411 approach to engaging contractors (e.g. Ontario Line) provided a low-risk market access
 412 point for international contractors.
 413 • **The level of ownership by industry actors.** A high level of project ownership offered
 414 to industry actors (e.g. Sepulveda Transit Corridor) was a key selling point to
 415 organisations looking to tender for the project.

416 Comparatively, Australian clients, such as Sydney Metro, have room to improve in all four
 417 success factors as identified in Table 5 below.

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420 **Table 5: Project maturity across key success factors (Legend: • low •• medium ••• high)**

Project element	Doha Metro	Sepulveda Transit Corridor	Ontario Line	Sydney Metro (comparative)
Level of client maturity	•	•••	•••	••
Strength of the regional project pipeline	•••	••	••	•
Level of contract maturity	•	••	•••	•
Level of ownership by industry actors	•	•••	••	••

421
 422 The key success factors that appear to be leading to greater participation can all be influenced
 423 by client organisations. In the context of Sydney Metro, these success factors align with known
 424 constraints to partnering with the international private sector. An ongoing focus on these
 425 success factors would support the implementation of the NSW Government Action Plan: “A
 426 ten-point commitment to the construction sector”. This Action Plan aims to:

- 427 1. Procure and manage projects in a more collaborative way
- 428 2. Adopt partnership-based approaches to risk allocation
- 429 3. Standardise contracts and procurement methods
- 430 4. Develop and promote a transparent pipeline of projects
- 431 5. Reduce the cost of bidding
- 432 6. Establish a consistent NSW Government policy on bid cost contributions
- 433 7. Monitor and reward high performance
- 434 8. Improve the security and timeliness of contract payments
- 435 9. Improve skills and training
- 436 10. Increase industry diversity

437 Improving our understanding of metro rail projects across other global jurisdictions can help
 438 re-frame the discussion locally about key blockers to participation by international industry
 439 actors in current and future Sydney Metro delivery activities. Desktop research provides an
 440 overview of participation and approaches. Making the direct connections with practitioners that
 441 have a direct involvement across the three comparable case studies has then provided insights
 442 into how and why international industry actors are participating.

443 5. References and citations

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 450 *construction sector*, viewed September 2021.
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